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It is analyzed the impacts of outsourcing cost and wage tax progression under labor market 
imperfections with Nash wage bargaining and flexible outsourcing. With sufficiently strong 
(weak) labor market imperfection, lower outsourcing cost has a wage-moderating (wage-
increasing) effect so that there is a negative (positive) effect on equilibrium unemployment. 
Higher tax progression, to keep the relative tax burden per worker constant, has a wage 
moderating and a positive effect on employment and negative effect on outsourcing. 
JEL-Code: H22, J41, J51. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Wage differences across countries constitute an important explanation for the 
currently significant business practice of international outsourcing.
1 Outsourcing can 
take two alternative forms. Firms may write long-term contracts that fix the amount of 
outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage, or alternatively firms may be flexible 
enough later on to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity after the domestic 
wage is set by the trade union.  
In the presence of flexible outsourcing it is analyzed the following questions:
2 
What are the effects of the outsourcing costs and the wage tax rate and the tax 
exemption on the Nash wage formation under labor market imperfections with   
substitutability between outsourcing and domestic labor? What are the effects of the 
labor tax reform, to keep the relative tax burden per worker constant, on domestic wage 
setting, employment and outsourcing?
3 With flexible outsourcing the wage elasticity of 
domestic labor demand is an increasing function of the lower outsourcing cost and of 
higher wage rate of domestic labor.  With sufficiently strong (weak) labor market 
imperfections a lower outsourcing cost has a wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect 
so that there is a negative (positive) effect on equilibrium unemployment. The wage tax 
rate has a positive effect and the tax exemption a negative effect on the wage 
negotiation. Higher tax progression under Nash wage bargaining, to keep the relative 
tax burden per worker constant, has a wage-moderating effect and a positive effect on 
domestic employment and a negative effect on outsourcing.  
Section II presents the basic structure of theoretical framework and domestic 
labor demand and outsourcing are studied in section III. Wage determination and 
equilibrium unemployment are presented in section IV under linearly progressive wage 
                                                 
1       Amiti and Wei (2005) emphasize the big difference on labor costs as the main explanation for the 
strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing and services to countries with low labor 
costs. 
2        Skaksen (2004) has analyzed in the absence of taxation the implications of outsourcing for wage 
setting and employment under imperfectly competitive labor markets in terms of both potential 
(non-realized) and realized international outsourcing for wage setting and employment by 
assuming that the firms do not commit themselves to outsourcing prior wage negotiation.   
3      This has been analyzed in the absence of outsourcing, see e.g. Koskela and Vilmunen (1996).   3
tax. The effects of labor tax progression on wage setting, employment and outsourcing 
are analyzed in section V and conclusions in section VI. 
 
II.  Basic Framework 
 
At stage 1 the government as a Stackelberg leader fixes labor tax parameters. 
The government employs a wage tax rate t, which is levied on the wage w, minus a 
tax exemption a. The tax base per worker for t equals  ) ( a w−  and the marginal tax 
rate  t exceeds the average tax rate  ) / 1 ( w a t −  so that the tax system is linearly 
progressive.
4 The net-of-tax wage, the worker receives, is given by  . ) 1 ( ta t w w
n + − =  
At stage 2 the labor union and the firm negotiate wage formation by taking tax 
parameters as given and anticipating the domestic labor demand and outsourcing. At 
stage 3 both the domestic labor demand and the outsourcing is decided by the firm by 
taking tax parameters and wage setting as given.  
To derive an explicit solution a decreasing returns to scale production function 











= M L M L R ,    0 , 1 > > γ δ                                (1) 
where  L is the amount of domestic labor and M denotes the firm’s labor input 
acquired from external suppliers through outsourcing. The parameter  1 > δ  means that 
the production function is a concave function of domestic labor and outsourcing 
inputs.
5 According to (1) domestic labor and outsourcing are substitutes and the 
parameter  0 > γ  captures the productivity of outsourcing relative to labor.   
 
                                                 
4       For about tax progression, see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8. 
5      Lommerud et el. (2006) in the absence of taxation have demonstrated how international mergers 
might curb the market power of unions giving socially excessive incentive for international 
mergers, unless products are close substitutes. This paper does not focus on the simultaneous 
presence of imperfections in labor and product markets.      4
III.  Domestic Labor Demand and Outsourcing 
 
Under flexible outsourcing the firm decides simultaneously on domestic 
employment  L and outsourcing M  so as to maximize the profit function the output 
price is normalized to unity   















π ,                          (2) 
  by taking the negotiated wage and the cost of outsourcing as given, where 
2 5 , 0 ) ( cM M C =  is a convex cost of establishing capacity M  for foreign outsourced. 
This outsourcing labor input captures the idea that exploitation of the marginal cost 
advantages associated with production in low-wage countries typically requires that the 
firm makes irreversible investment into the establishment of network of supplies in the 
relevant low-wage countries. The first-order conditions are  () 0
1
= − + =
− w M L L δ γ π ,                            
and  () 0
1
= − + =
− cM M L M γ γ π δ , which give the labor demand and outsourcing  
      
c
w
w M w L
2 γ γ
δ δ − = − =
− − ,                                                  (3a) 
                                   
c
w
M γ = .                                                                                 (3b) 
Domestic labor demand is a negative function of wage rate and productivity of 
outsourcing, and a positive function of cost of outsourcing, while outsourcing is a 
positive function of wage rate and productivity of outsourcing and a negative function 
of cost of outsourcing. In this model the outsourcing elasticities are constant, while the 
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The relationship between the wage rate (the outsourcing cost) and the wage elasticity of 
domestic labor demand is positive (negative), i.e.  0 ) 1 )( 1 ( *
*
> + + =
wL
M
w γ δ η η  and 









c γ γ δ η  Higher wage rate and lower outsourcing cost   5
increasing the wage elasticity of domestic labor demand lies in conformity with 
empirical evidence.
6 Also the productivity of outsourcing will have a positive effect on 
the wage elasticity of domestic labor demand, i.e.  . 0 > γ η  
 
IV.  Wage Determination via Nash Bargaining  under  Linearly   
Progressive Wage Tax 
 
This section investigates wage determination by applying the Nash bargaining 
following the right-to-manage approach. The labor union’s objective function in the 
presence of linearly progressive wage taxation is assumed to be 
) ( ) ) 1 ( ( ˆ * * L N b L ta t w U − + + − =  under the wage tax rate t and the tax exemption a and 
* L  denotes the total domestic employment. b  is the outside option available to union 
members and N is the number of union members ( )
* L N ≥  and the threat point is 
Nb U
o =  so that the relevant target function of the labor union is 
) ) 1 ( ( ˆ * b ta t w L Nb U U − + − = − = . The firm and the labor union negotiate wage rate to 
solve the following optimization problem  
 
{ [] [ ]
β β −
− − − + − = Ω
1 2 * * * * * 5 , 0 ) , ( ) ) 1 ( ( M wL M L R b ta t w L Max
w
                          (5) 






−  , 
where the relative bargaining power of the labor union (the firm) is β  ( β − 1 ). The 
first-order condition for the negotiated wage rate can be written as  
                        0 ) 1 ( 0 *
*







,                                                         (6) 
where  
          0
) ( ) 1 (
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Uw γ η γ η
,                                   (7a) 
and  
                                                 
6        See e.g. Slaughter (2001) and Hasan et al. (2007).    6
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L w                    (7b) 
Substituting (7a) and (7b) into the first-order condition (6) gives the following Nash 
bargaining solution for the negotiated wage  
 
               b A b w
N ˆ ˆ
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 2 )( 1 (
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 2 (
=
− − + + − −
− − + + −
=
δ β η δ η β
δ β η δ βη
                                            (8) 
 








ˆ  and the mark-up  1 > A  as  0 1 > ≥ β . 
Equation (8) is not an explicit form for the wage rate under outsourcing because the 
mark-up depends in a non-linear way on the wage ratio via the ratio between 
outsourcing and domestic labor demand.  Before initiating a detailed analysis of the 
relationship we report the negotiated wage for the two special cases with all the 
bargaining power concentrated into the hands of the labor union or the firm, 
respectively. In the case of a monopoly labor union ( 1 = β ) the wage is also determined 
in implicit form according to 
 





1 ) , , (
) , , ( ˆ











β .                                (8’)  
 
If the firm has all the bargaining power the mark-up factor is reduced to one according 
to 
       b w
N ˆ
0 =
= β .                       (8’’) 
  By differentiating the negotiated wage (8) with respect to the outsourcing cost c gives 
(see Appendix A) 













                                                                                          (9)   7
where  0 1 > −
A
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.  According 
to (9) the lower outsourcing cost can decrease wage setting if the relative bargaining 
power of labor union is higher than the low threshold. This threshold is inversely 
related to the wage elasticity. Lower outsourcing cost increases the wage elasticity of 
domestic labor demand by decreasing the mark-up. This is the dominant effect as long 
as the labor union has a sufficiently strong bargaining power. Also wage is affected by 
the negative effect on profit according to (7b) and when the labor union has a 
sufficiently low bargaining power, higher outsourcing due to lower outsourcing cost 
moderates the profit reducing effect of a higher wage. In this case more outsourcing 
induces an increase in the wage when the bargaining power lies with the firm to a 
sufficient degree.
7   
In terms of the wage tax rate and the tax exemption differentiating (8) gives  
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       (10)                               
 
These results can be summarized in 
 
Proposition 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing with sufficiently strong 
(weak) labor market imperfections a lower outsourcing cost has a wage-
moderating (wage-increasing) effect so that with a monopoly labor union, a 
lower outsourcing cost moderates wages. The wage tax rate (tax exemption) 
has a positive (negative) effect on wage negotiation. 
 
We now analyze the effect of outsourcing cost given labor tax parameters on 
equilibrium unemployment. According to (8) the wage formation for workers is of the 
form  b A w








ˆ  contains the outside option and the linearly 
                                                 
7       This has been analyzed in Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) in the presence of strategic outsourcing 
without labor taxation.   8
progressive wage taxation parameters and the mark-up factor is  1 > A . In a general 
equilibrium the term b  should be re-interpreted as the endogenous outside option. By 
assuming that the taxation is linearly progressive both in the presence of getting 
employment and in the case of not getting employment but unemployment benefit, 
which we specify as  
 
                ) ) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( )( 1 ( ta t b u ta t w u b
N + − + + − − =                                                (11) 
 
where  u  is the unemployment rate, b  captures the unemployment benefit and w 
denotes the wage formation in identical industries (see, e.g. Nickell and Layard (1999), 
p. 3048-3049 for a further discussion). Assuming a constant benefit-replacement ratio 
1 / 0 < = <
N w b q  equation (11) can be expressed as  
              
                  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
) ) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( )( 1 (
t w q u ta t w
ta t qw u ta t w u b
N N
N N
− − + + −
= + − + + − − =
                                     (12) 
Under this assumption we have 
N N w q u w
t
ta b
b ) 1 (
1
ˆ − + =
−
−
=  and  b A w
N ˆ =  can be 
written in terms of endogenous outside option as  [ ]
N N N w q u w A w ) 1 ( − + =  so that the 
equilibrium unskilled unemployment can be presented 
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In terms of outsourcing cost we have as for the impact of outsourcing cost on 








Combining this observation with (9) we can draw the conclusion that  
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if only and if
c d
du .            (14)   9
This result can be summarized in 
 
Proposition 2: In the presence of flexible outsourcing with sufficiently strong 
(weak) labor market imperfections a lower outsourcing cost has a negative 
(positive) effect on equilibrium unemployment so that with a monopoly labor 
union, a lower outsourcing cost moderates wages and equilibrium 
unemployment. 
 
V.  Effects of Labor Tax Progression Policy on Wage Negotiation, 
Employment and Outsourcing 
 
Now the analysis concentrates on the effects of tax progression for wage 
formation and employment by looking as the tax reform that increases tax progression 
while keeping the average tax burden per worker constant so that 




t = −                                                             (15) 
is constant. The average tax rate progression ( ARP) is given by the difference between 
the marginal tax rate t and the average tax rate 
a t , 
a t t ARP − ≡ . The tax system is 
progressive if  ARP is positive and progression is increased if  ARP increases. 
Government raises the degree of tax progression by increasing t and adjusts a 
upwards such that 
a t  remains constant. In this analysis the fully-balanced public sector 
budget aspect is not considered, because only some sectors may engage outsourcing, 
but not the whole economy.  
First the analysis focuses the wage effect of this tax reform under Nash 
domestic wage bargaining. Differentiating (15) with respect to t,  a and w to keep it 










 and the total wage effect is  da w dt w dw a t + = . 
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a t .                         
A higher degree of tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant, 
will decrease the wage rate in the presence of flexible outsourcing. The employment 
and outsourcing effects of this labor tax reform by using equations (3a), (3b), (16) are 
  






























                                 (17) 
 
The wage moderating effect of tax progression, to keep the relative tax burden per 
worker constant, increases domestic labor demand and decreases outsourcing in the 
presence of flexible outsourcing.
8 These results can be summarized in 
 
Proposition 3: In the presence of flexible outsourcing increasing the degree 
of tax progression under Nash wage bargaining, to keep the relative tax 
burden per worker constant, has a wage-moderating effect, a positive effect 
on domestic employment and a negative effect on outsourcing.    
 
VI.  Conclusions  
 
This paper has presented the following things in the case of homogenous 
domestic labor demand with the presence of flexible outsourcing: What are the effects 
of outsourcing costs on wage formation in an imperfectly competitive labor market 
under Nash wage bargaining? What are the effects of one labor tax reform on domestic 
wage setting and domestic employment as well as on outsourcing under flexible 
outsourcing? It has been shown that with sufficiently strong (weak) labor market 
imperfections a lower outsourcing cost has a wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect 
so that there is a negative (positive) effect on equilibrium unemployment. Increasing 
                                                 






β A  the qualitative results (16), (17) are similar (see 
e.g. Koskela and Schöb (2008)).     11
the degree of tax progression under Nash wage bargaining, to keep the relative tax 
burden per worker constant, has a wage-moderating effect and a positive effect of 
domestic employment and a negative effect on outsourcing.  
   12
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Appendix A: Nash wage bargaining and outsourcing cost 
Differentiation of (8) with respect to w and c and substituting  A w b / ˆ =  for b ˆ gives 
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Differentiating the mark-up with respect to the wage ( 0 > = w w Z η ) gives 
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By using (A3) and (A4) equation (A1) can be expressed as    
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